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This article will propose that Major League Soccer (”MLS” or “League”) 
adopt a salary arbitration system similar to that used in both Major League 
Baseball (“MLB”) and the National Hockey League (“NHL”).   
In a professional sports context, salary arbitration is a system that is 
implemented to settle salary disputes between a team and a player when salary 
negotiations fail.1  Generally, such disputes are consequently submitted to 
neutral arbitrators who weigh evidence of a player's performance, ability, and 
leadership, in comparison with other players.2  The arbitrator will then 
accordingly render a binding decision with respect to the amount of 
compensation to which the player will be entitled.3 
The NHL and MLB have such salary arbitration systems that afford 
players the ability to obtain fair resolutions to their salary disputes.4  These 
salary arbitration systems can confer a variety of benefits for players.  For 
example, the MLB’s salary arbitration system has become a significant factor 
in driving player salaries upward because the system provides players with 
additional leverage in settling contract disputes.5  Likewise, the NHL’s salary 
arbitration system has been identified as a major contributing factor for the 
“sudden explosion” of player salaries since 1990.6   
Professional sports leagues that do not contain salary arbitration systems, 
like the National Football League (“NFL”) and National Basketball 
                                                          
* B.S., University of California, Santa Barbara, 2012; J.D. Candidate, Pepperdine University 
School of Law, 2019.  The author would like to thank Professor Maureen Weston for her support of 
the Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal.  The author would also like to thank his wife, 
Watita Real, for her unwavering support during his legal education. 
1 Mélanie Aubut, When Negotiations Fail: An Analysis of Salary Arbitration and Salary Cap 
Systems, 10 SPORTS L.J. 189, 191 (2003). 
2 Id.  
3 Id. 
4 Id. at 193. 
5 See Ed Edmonds, A Most Interesting Part of Baseball's Monetary Structure-Salary 
Arbitration in its Thirty-Fifth Year, 20 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 1, 3 (2009). 
6 Stephen J. Bartlett, Contract Negotiations and Salary Arbitration in the NHL: An Agent's 
View, 4 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 1, 1 (1993). 
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Association (“NBA”), often run into problems when disputes between players 
and their teams over the renegotiation of player salaries arise.7  For example, 
despite generating as much revenue as MLB and NHL combined,8 the average 
salary of NFL players lags behind those leagues by $2.3 million and $800,000, 
respectively.9   
In 2016, MLS viewership surged to 25.7 million gross, with 55% of 
viewers in the highly desirable eighteen to forty-nine year-old demographic; 
live attendance ballooned to an average of 21,692 per game, behind only the 
MLB and NFL.10   
Moreover, youth soccer is one of the fastest growing sports in the United 
States for both boys and girls.11  Around 3 million kids play in U.S. Youth 
Soccer leagues, and “youth soccer participation doubles tackle football now[,] 
and has over a million more kids than baseball.”12  Thus, it is evident that the 
nation’s interest in soccer is the highest it has ever been.13 
To keep this momentum rolling, MLS should emulate those strategies of 
other professional leagues that have resulted in growth.  The salary arbitration 
model is one such advantageous strategy. 
Part II of this article will provide a summary of the current salary 
structures and mechanisms of MLS.14  Part II will also discuss the problems 
and the origins of the problems associated with MLS's current salary 
structures and mechanisms.  Part III will summarize how salary arbitration is 
utilized in MLB.15  Part III will additionally examine and recommend which 
beneficial mechanisms of the MLB salary arbitration model should be 
implemented in MLS.  Part IV will summarize how salary arbitration is 
utilized in the NHL.  Part IV will also examine and recommend which 
                                                          
7 See, e.g., Scott Bukstein, A New Solution for Salary Disputes: Implementing Salary 
Arbitration in the National Basketball Association, 22 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 25, 38–44 (2011); see 
also, e.g., Roger Quiles, A Solution to Holdouts in the National Football League: How Salary 
Arbitration Can Limit a Growing Problem, 13 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 259, 263–66 (2011).  
8 See Which Professional Sports Leagues Make the Most Money?, HOWMUCH.NET (July 1, 
2016), https://howmuch.net/articles/sports-leagues-by-revenue. 
9 Kurt Badenhausen, The Average Player Salary And Highest-Paid In NBA, MLB, NHL, NFL 
And MLS, FORBES (Dec. 15, 2016, 9:34 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kurtbadenhausen/2016/12/15/average-player-salaries-in-major-
american-sports-leagues/#565c26ce1050. 
10 Mark J. Burns, MLS Records Banner Year In 2016, Cements Position Among Top U.S. Pro 
Sports League, FORBES (Oct. 26, 2016, 9:21 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/markjburns/2016/10/26/mls-records-banner-year-in-2016-cements-
position-among-top-u-s-pro-sports-leagues/#757fc96278a2. 
11 See Chris Demaria, What Are the Most Popular Youth Sports?, LIVESTRONG (Sept. 11, 
2017), https://www.livestrong.com/article/99949-popular-youth-sports/.  
12 Shane Paul Neil, Soccer Is Here, for Real This Time, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 4, 2016, 1:01 
PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/shane-paul-neil/soccer-is-here-for-real-t_b_9730440.html 
(concluding that “youth participation, health of its minor leagues, and valuations of its clubs show 
that [soccer’s] rapid growth is both real and spectacular.”). 
13 Id. 
14 Collective Bargaining Agreement Between Major League Soccer and Major League Soccer 
Players Union: February 1, 2015 – January 31, 2020 (detailing the current salary structure of MLS). 
15 For an especially in-depth discussion on the mechanisms of the MLB and NHL, see Aubut, 
supra note 1, at 201–12. 
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beneficial mechanisms of the NHL salary arbitration model should be 
implemented in MLS.16  Part V will anticipate and explain some of the 
limitations and criticisms inherent to a potential MLS salary arbitration model.  
Finally, part VI will conclude that the potential benefits of implementing the 
proposed MLS salary arbitration model outweigh any potential limitations. 
This article will center its arguments around the idea that a salary 
arbitration system represents the development of a compensation system that 
is more fair and equitable for its players.  The development of such a system 
will thereby allow MLS to continue its expansion as a major professional 
sports league.  However, it is important to note that this article does not intend 
to propose and fully detail a wholly new and working MLS salary arbitration 
system.  Such a gargantuan task would be Sisyphean considering the 
continually changing landscape of the expanding MLS.  Rather, this article 
aims to demonstrate how the implementation of specific, reasonable salary 
arbitration mechanisms, appropriated from MLB and the NHL, can help the 
exponentially growing MLS evade the mistakes of its older brothers.  
 
II. THE CURRENT SALARY SYSTEM OF MAJOR LEAGUE SOCCER, AND THE 
PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE CURRENT SALARY SYSTEM. 
 
A. The Current Salary System of MLS  
 
Unlike other professional sports leagues in the United States, “it is [MLS], 
and not the team owners, that determines where players play and how much 
they’re paid.”17  The reasoning behind this unique League control is partly 
historical.  When MLS’s forefather, the North American Soccer League 
(“NASL”), was originally founded, it was the country's top professional 
circuit.18  The NASL failed largely because one of its teams, the Cosmos, paid 
huge sums to sign stars like Pelé and Franz Beckenbauer, which set off 
bidding wars that bankrupted rival teams.19 
To avoid such a fate, MLS was structured as a single-entity, limited 
liability corporation where the shareholders are the team owners.20  Therefore, 
the League sets budgets to control player salaries, and controls allotment of 
foreign-born players to teams.21 
 
                                                          
16 See Bukstein, supra note 7, at 45–52 (providing, in-depth, a similar discussion on the 
implementation of a salary arbitration model into the structures of the NBA). 
17 Aaron Elstein, Major League Soccer, Not Team Owners, Sets Players' Pay, CRAIN’S N.Y. 
BUS. (Apr. 2, 2017, 12:01 AM), 
http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20170402/SMALLBIZ/170339971/major-league-soccer-not-
team-owners-sets-players-pay.  The league itself determines player salary “to a degree unequaled” 
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B. Problems with MLS’s Current Salary System 
 
Under the current Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”), which was 
ratified July 16, 2015, MLS instituted a free agency system for the first time 
in its history.22  While this represented a step forward for players, the free 
agency system is extremely limited.  Free agency applies only to players who 
are twenty-eight years old, with at least eight years of experience in MLS, and 
are below the maximum salary.23  Additionally, the CBA puts limits on how 
much a free agent player’s new salary can increase.24  If a player is making 
less than $100,000, then the increase is capped at 25%, if the player is making 
$100,000 to $200,000, then the increase is capped at 20%, and if the player is 
making more than $200,000, then the increase is capped at 15%.25  
The limited nature of MLS’s current free agency system exemplifies 
essentially only a symbolic, rather than financial, victory for the players.26  In 
fact, there were a handful of anonymous quotes from players who were fully 
prepared to strike for better terms, and all indications were that seven out of 
the twenty clubs that participated in the negotiation voted against the 
agreement.27  According to one anonymous player at the CBA negotiation, 
“[p]layers are disappointed and upset with the union reps and Bob Foose.”28  
The player continued, “[n]ot only did this deal destroy the future of the 
American player, it barely helps the current group of players.”29  
This frustration is understandable considering that the twenty-eight and 
eight formula means only around 10% of current MLS players are eligible for 
free agency.30  This means that 90% of players are stuck playing for the teams 
the League tells them to play for at a salary dictated by the League without 
negotiation or discussion.  
Reflecting this frustration, a 2016 survey conducted by ESPN FC showed 
that 84% of MLS players polled believed themselves to be underpaid 
compared to the rest of the world.31  It is likely that this enormous response 
                                                          
22 MLSsoccer staff, MLS Players Union Announces that it has Ratified Collective Bargaining 
Agreement, MLS (July 16, 2015, 5:17 PM), https://www.mlssoccer.com/post/2015/07/16/mls-
players-union-announces-it-has-ratified-collective-bargaining-agreement.  
23 Id. 






28 Liviu Bird, MLS Player Involved in CBA Talks Says Many 'Upset,' 'Disappointed' with Deal, 
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Mar. 4, 2015), https://www.si.com/planet-futbol/2015/03/04/mls-cba-deal-
players-union/. Bob Foose is the MLS Players Union executive director. 
29 Id. 
30 Grove, supra note 24.  
31 Nick Borriello, ESPN Survey of MLS Players Reveals Salary Frustrations, SBNATION (Mar. 
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also reflected “lingering feelings of bitterness left over from a long and 
protracted battle over a new [CBA] prior to the 2015 season.”32  Furthermore, 
“[w]hen asked what one thing they would change about MLS, 44% of players 
said the salaries.”33  Additionally, 66% of MLS players responded that they 
would leave for Europe if they were given the chance.34 
 
C.  How the Single-Entity Structure Causes Many of MLS’s Problems 
Regarding Player Compensation 
 
As elaborated above, as a consequence of the failure of the NASL, the 
developers of MLS thought such a risk-friendly structure would appeal to 
investors, giving the League a greater chance of survival.35  However, many 
of the current problems associated with MLS’s salary system are inherent to 
MLS’s single-entity structure.   
One such problem is that, under MLS’s single-entity structure, when a 
player signs a deal, it is between the player and the League as a whole, rather 
than between the player and any individual team.36  As a consequence of this 
structure, teams do not compete with one another in signing players—players 
simply go where the league assigns them.37  If the player desires otherwise, 
then he is left with no other option except to leave the League.   This current 
state of limited movement for players is clearly unfair to the players, and is 
unlike any of the other major American professional sports leagues. 
Furthermore, choosing where to play is only one aspect of free agency, 
and arguably not the most important one to the players.  The more significant 
objective of free agency “is the ability to negotiate a salary on the free 
market.”38  If MLS had true free agency, a player would theoretically be free 
to go to any club to look for a contract offer, and then use the leverage that his 
ability to freely choose gives him to discuss more favorable terms with other 
clubs until one team has won the player’s “signature with some combination 
of the most attractive salary, most prominent role in the team, and best chance 
to win.”39 
However, as it stands now, the League has already restricted every free 
agent salary negotiation.40  Under MLS’s abrogated version of free agency, 
the League has mandated that “each of their franchises will only have to pay 
                                                          
32 See id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Heike K. Sullivan, Comment: Fraser v. Major League Soccer: The MLS’s Single-Entity 
Structure is a “Sham”, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 865, 865–66 (2000). 
36 Billy Haisley, MLS Players and Owners Agree to Keep League Mired in Mediocrity, 
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at most 125% of a player’s previous salary.”41  This free agency structure 
thereby anchors a player’s options for negotiation to his last contract, while 
failing to fully account for how much that player has improved since that 
player’s last contract.42  
Additionally, because the League is a single entity, League officials have 
the entirely inequitable power of having their subsidiaries, the teams, fully 
restrict the movement and negotiation power of a player by commanding a 
team to not offer the player a contract at all.43   
In fact, the League has already shown that it is not above using this 
central-planning power to orchestrate player movement.44   Further, the 
League’s restriction of player movement is not even limited to players within 
the MLS.45  For example, in 2012, the League stopped sought-after defender 
Olof Mellberg from transferring to Toronto F.C. from his club in Greece.46  It 
was suspected that the League blocked his transfer because, as a 
Scandinavian, Mellberg appealed to none of the sizable ethnic minorities the 
League covets as fans.47   While the Toronto players and fans were 
understandably furious, the League, as a single entity, is entitled to 
“manipulate its incoming contracts to place certain players in specific 
cities.”48 
When the League meddles with the competitive landscape, it is the fans 
as well as the League itself that lose.  While the League maneuvers in such a 
way as to ostensibly keep the competitive balance even amongst every team 
to keep fan interest, commentators and fans cannot help but feel that the 
League favors the larger market teams, like Los Angeles and New York, given 
those larger-market teams are often seen to be less hampered by such 
maneuvers.49   This perceived favoritism may or may not be true, but the ever-
present specter of League meddling undoubtedly turns off many long-term 
and potential fans.  For a league that is in its relative infancy and still needs 
                                                          
41 Id.; see also Paul Tenorio, MLS and players reach deal, avoid strike; Orlando City season to 
begin on time, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Mar. 4, 2015), https://www.orlandosentinel.com/sports/os-mls-
players-avoid-strike-orlando-city-20150304-post.html. 
42 See Haisley, supra note 36. 
43 Id. 
44 See, e.g., Cathal Kelley, Toronto FC’s Hands Tied by Meddling MLS: Kelly, THE STAR (Oct. 
28, 2012), 
https://www.thestar.com/sports/soccer/tfc/2012/10/28/toronto_fcs_hands_tied_by_meddling_mls_ke
lly.html; See also Grant Wahl, How Seattle's Stunning Clint Dempsey Deal Got Done, SI (Aug. 5, 
2013), https://www.si.com/soccer/2013/08/05/clint-dempsey-seattle-sounders-mls; Barry Petchesky, 
How MLS Made Sure Clint Dempsey Landed in Seattle, DEADSPIN (Aug. 5, 2013, 2:21PM), 
https://deadspin.com/how-mls-made-sure-clint-dempsey-landed-in-seattle-1030615076 (detailing 
another example of the League meddling with player transfers). 
45 See Kelley, supra note 44. 
46 See id.  
47 Id. 
48 Petchesky, supra note 44. 
49 See Kelley, supra note 46; see also Luke O’ Brien, MLS Salaries Make No Secret of MLS 
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more fans and viewers, such a public perception can be extremely harmful to 
the League’s growth. 
 Nevertheless, the single-entity structure is here to stay for the 
foreseeable and indefinite future.  In Fraser v. Major League Soccer, the 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit upheld the League’s single-entity 
structure.50   Therefore, this article will necessarily advocate for the 
implementation of a salary arbitration system within the confines of the 
League’s single-entity structure. 
 
III. AN OVERVIEW OF THE SALARY ARBITRATION MODELS  
OF MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, AND AN ARGUMENT FOR  
IMPLEMENTING BENEFICIAL MECHANISMS OF IT  
IN MAJOR LEAGUE SOCCER 
 
A. The MLB Salary Arbitration Model  
 
Major League Baseball uses “final-offer” arbitration as its salary 
arbitration system.51  Final-offer arbitration can be summarized as follows: 
[P]layers are separated into three categories: (1) pre-arbitration players; 
(2) players eligible for salary arbitration; and (3) free agents. These categories 
are based on the player's service time (i.e., the number of years and days of 
major league service a player has in their career). A team has the contractual 
rights to a player until that player has six years of service time and becomes a 
free agent. A pre-arbitration player will generally be a player who has less 
than three years of service time while a player who has at least three, but less 
than six years of service time will be eligible to enter the salary arbitration 
process.52 
According to the MLB, “Once a player becomes eligible for salary 
arbitration, he is eligible each offseason (assuming he is tendered a contract) 
until he reaches six years of Major League service.”53  It is at that point that a 
player becomes eligible for free agency.54 
                                                          
50 Fraser v. Major League Soccer, 284 F.3d 47, 71 (1st Cir. 2002) (affirming the district court’s 
judgments in favor of the defendant (League) on the plaintiffs’ (the players) claims under the 
Sherman and Clayton Acts against the single-entity structure). 
51 Justin Sievert, Breaking Down the MLB Salary Arbitration Process, SPORTING NEWS (Jan. 
12, 2018), http://www.sportingnews.com/mlb/news/mlb-salary-arbitration-process-breakdown-
spring-training-2016/4jkawqkczi8i17cb4rhqjxseh. 
52 Id.  Additionally, there is a special class of players, called “Super 2s”.  A Super 2 is a player 
who has between two and three years of service time, has at least 86 days of service time during the 
second year, and ranks in the top 22 percent of players who fall into that classification.  A Super 2 
player will have three years as a pre-arbitration eligible player and four arbitration years while a 
player who doesn't earn Super 2 status will have three years of salary arbitration following their four 
pre-arbitration year.  Id.  For simplicity, this note will not address how the Super 2 categorization 
can be applied to MLS. 
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Procedurally, “teams must offer eligible players arbitration by December 
12th, or else those players are non-tendered and released.”55  After that date, 
“players and teams have until January 17th to reach an agreement, or else both 
sides must submit their salary demands to an arbitration panel,”56 and the team 
“and player must exchange salary figures for the upcoming season” by that 
time as well.57  “Hearings are [then] conducted throughout the first few weeks 
of February.”58  Moreover, in “the week prior to the exchange of arbitration 
figures is when the vast majority of arbitration cases are avoided” as the player 
agrees to a one or multi-year contract.59  
Under the current MLB CBA, a three-arbitrator panel is used to arbitrate 
salary disputes between a player and his team.60  The panel is handpicked by 
the MLB Players Association (“MLBPA”) and the MLB Labor Relations 
Department (“MLBLRD”).61  The MLBPA, which represents the player, and 
MLBLRD, which represents the team, each put forth salary proposals that are 
presented in a hearing before the panel.62  The panel then uses a wide-range 
of criteria to determine which party’s proposal to accept.63   
The criteria to be considered by the panel are:  
[T]he quality of the Player's contribution to his Club during the past 
season . . . the length and consistency of his career contribution, the record of 
the Player's past compensation, comparative baseball salaries . . . the existence 
of any physical or mental defects on the part of the Player, and the recent 
performance record of the Club including but not limited to its League 
standing and attendance as an indication of public acceptance.64   
The parties may submit any evidence relevant to those criteria, and the 
arbitration panel weighs the evidence under the circumstances.65 
After hearing arguments from both sides, the panel selects the salary 
figure of either the player or the club (and only selects one of the two figures) 
as the player's salary for the upcoming season.66 
 
                                                          
55 Salary Arbitration, FANGRAPHS https://www.fangraphs.com/library/business/mlb-salary-
arbitration-rules/ (last updated Jan. 30, 2018 3:23 AM).  
56 Id. 
57 Salary Arbitration (MLB), supra note 53. 
58 Salary Arbitration, supra note 55. 
59 Salary Arbitration (MLB), supra note 53 (noting also that “[m]ulti-year deals, in these 
instances, serve as a means to avoid arbitration for each season that is covered under the new 
contract.”). 
60 2017–2021 MLB Collective Bargaining Agreement, art. VI, § E(5), 
http://www.mlbplayers.com/pdf9/5450407.pdf. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at § E(4). 
63 Quiles, supra note 7, at 269. 
64 Id. (including factors for player performance such as special qualities of leadership and 
public appeal). 
65 Id. 
66 Salary Arbitration (MLB), supra note 53. 
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B. The Beneficial Mechanisms of the MLB Salary Arbitration Model that  
Should be Implemented in MLS 
 
There are benefits to both the players and teams conferred by the MLB’s 
salary arbitration system.67  During the first three years of service, a pre-
arbitration eligible player will typically make somewhere around the league 
minimum salary.68  However, after those three years, the player accrues 
enough service time to be eligible for salary arbitration.69  This is a benefit for 
the player because that player now has some leverage to earn a salary that is 
at least commensurate with that player's past performance.70  For an example 
of how valuable this leverage can be, Chris Carter of the Houston Astros 
entered salary arbitration eligibility in 2015.71  In 2014 his salary was 
$510,000.72  He signed a deal in 2015 in which the team agreed (at least in 
part) to avoid a salary arbitration hearing.73  The new deal was worth 
$4,175,000, which was an increase of 719% from his salary the year prior.74   
Still, salary arbitration is also a benefit for the owners because, although 
the player will receive a salary increase, the player will still likely earn a salary 
lower than their true value on the free agent market.75  It should also be noted, 
there is evidence that MLB’s salary arbitration model seems to slightly favor 
the owner’s side once the arbitration hearing is initiated.76  From 1974 to 2015, 
the owners had won 57.66% of arbitration hearings.77 
Considering the benefits that MLB’s method of conferring arbitration 
eligibility after three years yields, MLS can viably implement a system 
wherein arbitration eligibility is also gained after a set number of years.  Given 
that the careers of MLB and MLS players are relatively similar in length,78 a 
                                                          
67 Quiles, supra note 7, at 270. 
68 Details of MLB, MLBPA Labor Agreement, MLB (Dec. 2, 2016), 
http://m.mlb.com/news/article/210125462/details-of-mlb-mlbpa-labor-agreement/.  In 2017, the 
minimum salary in MLB was $535,000 for the year.  Id. 
69 Sievert, supra note 51. 
70 Id. 
71 Maury Brown, Who's Winning the MLB Salary Arbitration Game? Here's Data from 1974 to 
2015, FORBES (Feb. 23, 2015, 8:10 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/maurybrown/2015/02/23/whos-winning-the-mlb-salary-arbitration-
game-heres-data-from-1974-to-2015/#551be4eb1558. 
72 Id.  
73 See id. 
74 Id. 
75 Sievert, supra note 51. “This is important for the team because the team will either save 
money, or it can use the savings on other players.”  Id.  
76 Brown, supra note 71, at 2. 
77 Id. 
78 The average length of a MLB player career is 5.6 years.  Average Major League Baseball 
Career 5.6 Years, Says New Study, SCI. DAILY (July 11, 2007) 
https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2007/07/070709131254.htm.  It should be noted, however, 
that the average length of an MLS player’s career is only 2.5 seasons; however, “If a MLS player 
makes it past the third year, chances are good for a relatively long MLS career.”  A Demographic 
Analysis of MLS Players, SOCCERMETRICS (Dec. 21, 2010), http://www.soccermetrics.net/paper-
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straight adoption of MLB’s method of conferring arbitration after an accrual 
of three years seems practical.   
Moreover, the procedures of MLB’s arbitration system encourage a party 
to submit a sufficiently reasonable offer so that an arbitrator will be persuaded 
to select it.79  It has been argued that negotiations thereby progress more 
smoothly because the difference between the two offers is not too large.80  The 
tendering of reasonable offers is likely the reason why such a small percentage 
of the cases filed ever make it to an arbitration hearing.81 
The MLB system’s use of a panel is also beneficial.  Panels help create 
improved dialogue and an opportunity to study the market together and reach 
a group consensus.82  Thus, an adoption of this mechanism by MLS would 
likely also be a positive step forward. 
Furthermore, the criteria considered by the MLB, outlined above, should 
be applied to MLS because it is a reasonable and ostensibly impartial method 
of coming to a salary figure that is commensurate with the player’s past 
performance.  In contrast to the current method, this method of application 
would not be left entirely to the League’s determination of the player’s 
value.83  Therefore, an adoption of MLB’s method of looking at criteria is 
preferable to the capricious system that MLS currently uses. 
 
IV.  AN OVERVIEW OF THE SALARY ARBITRATION MODEL OF THE 
NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE, AND AN ARGUMENT FOR IMPLEMENTING 
BENEFICIAL MECHANISMS OF IT IN MAJOR LEAGUE SOCCER 
 
A. The NHL Salary Arbitration Model 
 
In the NHL’s salary arbitration system, most players must accrue four 
years of NHL experience before they are eligible for salary arbitration.84  In 
addition, the NHL’s CBA specifies the number of games a player must play 
                                                          
discussions/demographic-analysis-of-mls-players-boyden-carey (summarizing Nathaniel Boyden 
and James Carey, From One-and-Done to Seasoned Veterans: A Demographic Analysis of 
Individual Career Length in Major League Soccer, JOURNAL OF QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS IN 
SPORTS, 6(4): Article 5, 2010).  
79 Aubut, supra note 1, at 236. 
80 See id. (commenting further that the offers are not as large as in the NHL, where both parties 
tend to take extreme positions to leave room for the arbitrator to decide on a figure somewhere in the 
middle). 
81 Id. 
82 See Bukstein, supra note 7, at 37 (arguing, in the context of the NBA, that a two-member 
panel would be even more advantageous because it would “help avoid the phenomena of arbitrators 
strategically not siding with one party too often and of ‘groupthink’ that seems to happen 
occasionally in a three-person panel in baseball.”). 
83 See Bukstein, supra note 7, at 26. 
84 Jamie Fitzpatrick, NHL Salary Arbitration Explained, THOUGHTCO (Mar. 19, 2017), 
https://www.thoughtco.com/nhl-salary-arbitration-explained-2778981.  The term is reduced for those 
who signed their first NHL contract after the age of twenty.  Id. 
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in a particular season in order to constitute a year of accrued professional 
experience.85  According to the CBA:  
 
A player aged 18 or 19 earns a year of professional experience 
by playing ten (10) or more NHL Games in a given season.  A 
player aged 20 or older (or who turns 20 between September 
16 and December 31 of the calendar year in which he signs his 
first standard player contract) earns a year of professional 
experience by playing ten (10) or more Professional Games 
under a standard player contract in a given season.86 
 
Unlike the MLB system, only restricted free agents are allowed to utilize 
the salary arbitration process.87  Under the CBA, teams retain certain rights 
regarding restricted free agents, even after the term of their contract has 
expired.88  A valuable right for the team is the right to prevent the player from 
signing with any other club.89  The NHL’s system is meant to allow the player 
to achieve their market value while also preserving the rights of the club.90 
Procedurally, the NHL system is rather complicated and detailed.  The 
deadline for players to request salary arbitration each year is July 5, with cases 
heard in late July and early August.91  Oftentimes, players and teams will 
continue to negotiate up until the date of the hearing in order to come to an 
agreement on a contract and avoid the arbitration process.92 
Both the player (or the NHL Players’ Association (“NHLPA”)) and the 
team must submit briefs to the salary arbitrator and each other at least forty-
eight hours before the hearing begins.93  The hearing is conducted by one 
neutral arbitrator.94  The arbitrator is randomly selected from a pool of eight 
arbitrators, who are all members of the National Academy of Arbitrators and 
are chosen jointly by the NHL and the NHLPA.95  At the hearing, each side, 
the NHLPA/player and the NHL team, gets ninety minutes to state its case.96  
These ninety minutes will normally include rebuttals to the presentation of 
                                                          
85 Ryan Lake, How Salary Arbitration Works in the National Hockey League (NHL), 







91 Fitzpatrick, supra note 84. 
92 Id. 
93 See Dan Ryan, Spooner vs. the Bruins: How Does NHL Arbitration Work?, SBNATION (July 
25, 2016), https://www.stanleycupofchowder.com/2017/7/25/16023102/ryan-spooner-arbitration-
hearing-how-does-nhl-arbitration-work-nhl-average-salary-arbitration-rights; Aubut, supra note 1, at 
204. 
94 Aubut, supra note 1, at 203. 
95 Id. at 203–04. 
96 Ryan, supra note 93. 
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argument and comparisons of players from the opposing party.97  In the NHL 
system, the arbitrator is permitted to play an active role during the hearing.98  
The arbitrator has discretion to call witnesses and request documents 
necessary for a fair resolution of the dispute.99   
Per the current NHL CBA, there is a multitude of evidence the sides are 
able to present, including: the player’s overall performance, the player’s 
National Hockey League official statistics, the number of games that the 
player has played, his past injuries or illnesses, the player’s length of service 
in the league and with the team, the player’s overall contribution to the success 
or failure of his team in past seasons, any particular evidence of leadership or 
public appeal in keeping with his responsibilities as a team member, the 
overall performance in past seasons of any players who may be comparable 
to the player whose salary is in dispute, and the compensation of any players 
who are alleged to be comparable to the player at issue.100  Additionally, the 
arbitrator is not bound by evidentiary rules, which allows the arbitrator to 
freely weigh each piece of evidence.101 
The arbitrator’s decision must be made within forty-eight hours of the 
hearing.102  The decision includes the duration of the contract, the yearly 
salary, any minor league clauses, and a brief explanation.103   
Overall, this salary arbitration system also confers benefits to both players 
and teams.  Like the MLB system, the NHL arbitration system provides a 
crucial bargaining option for players facing restricted free agency.104  Another 
benefit for the player is that there are no limitations on the number of times a 
player can ask for arbitration and the sum of the salary awarded.105 
The NHL’s system also allows teams to ask for salary arbitration.106  
However, players may only participate in arbitration once during their career, 
and their salaries can never be reduced by more than 15% of the previous 
year.107   
When the arbitrator’s decision is announced, the team has the right to 
"walk away" from the award, unless it is the party that filed the arbitration 
hearing.108  Nevertheless, “[i]f the team exercises this right, the player can 
declare himself an unrestricted free agent.”109 
                                                          
97 Id. 
98 Aubut, supra note 1, at 204. 
99 Id. 
100 Ryan, supra note 93.  There is also a number of items of evidence that cannot be used: 
contracts signed by players who were not restricted free agents, any previous negotiations between 
the player and the team, news reports or press briefings, and the financial condition of the team.  Id.  
101 Aubut, supra note 1, at 204. 
102 Fitzpatrick, supra note 84. 
103 Ryan, supra note 93. 




108 Id.; Ryan, supra note 93. 
109 Fitzpatrick, supra note 84. 
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B. The Beneficial Mechanisms of the NHL Salary Arbitration Model that 
Should be Implemented in MLS  
 
There are many mechanisms of the NHL salary arbitration model that can 
be used effectively in the framework of MLS.  For example, in the NHL, the 
arbitrator can award a salary consistent with either of the two offers made by 
the parties or for an amount ranging anywhere in between the two offers.110  
The NHL system enables the arbitrator to hear both parties' points of view and 
is, thereby, able to come to areasonable compromise: taking into account the 
specific circumstances surrounding a player.111  This would allow an arbitrator 
flexibility when players and the League have greatly disparate salary 
proposals.  Adoption of this mechanism would thus be a positive decision for 
MLS.   
Moreover, the NHL system’s method of exchanging salary figures 
between the team and player is a highly valuable mechanism.  Beginning in 
the 1990s, NHL players' salaries began to rise dramatically.112  Commentators 
have asserted that the exchange of salary figures between player and team 
representatives is a factor explaining the jump in salaries.113  Before the salary 
arbitration system was implemented, it was more difficult for agents to 
surmise if the salary they were seeking for their client was too high or too low 
in relation to that player’s market value.114  Due to the increased transparency 
in information exchange, agents now have this valuable information to use as 
leverage when negotiating their client's salary.115  Clearly, MLS would do well 
to emulate the NHL’s information exchange mechanism if it wants its players 
to become more satisfied with their salaries. 
For the benefit of the owners, another mechanism MLS can borrow is 
NHL teams’ "walk-away rights."116  An NHL team has the right to reject the 
arbitrator's award and refuse to bind itself to the decision, which allows the 
player to either become an unrestricted free agent or accept the last offer that 
was on the table by the team before the hearing.117  This mechanism would 
first alleviate any potential issues the League may have with subjecting itself 
to binding arbitration regarding salaries.  Secondly, this aspect would allow 
for players, by becoming unrestricted free agents, to have even more 
autonomy in pursuing salaries that are commensurate with their market value.  
 
 
                                                          
110 Bukstein, supra note 7, at 50. 
111 Aubut, supra note 1, at 236. 




116 NHL Collective Bargaining Agreement, art. 12. 
117 NHL Collective Bargaining Agreement, art. 12. 
13
Real: Salary Arbitration in Major League Soccer
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2019
                        Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal [Vol. 19:3 
 
324
IV. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH INCORPORATING MLB AND  
NHL SALARY MODELS 
 
A.   The Potential Reticence of the Owners  
 
Owners may see expanded free agency and salary arbitration as a threat 
to the League’s structure because it would set the members within the single 
entity of MLS in opposition to each other.118  This would be especially bad 
for the League because such negotiations would make the League look less 
like a synchronized organization in the eyes of the law, which could make it 
susceptible to antitrust lawsuits.119  
In fact, the League has been attacked on antitrust grounds before.120  A 
change that could bring the League in front of a court again could be argued 
by the owners to be against MLS’s overall interest.  Furthermore, any change 
that could once again create an adversarial relationship between the League 
and the players will undoubtedly be unwelcome in the owners’ eyes.   
Nevertheless, the reality is that a high number of players are already 
dissatisfied with the current state of MLS’s compensation structure, and there 
is already some hostility from the players toward the owners.121  Thus, a salary 
arbitration system structured with the reasonable mechanisms detailed above 
represents a palatable method by which salary disputes can be effectively and 
congenially settled.122 
 
B. The Difficulties of Instituting Salary Arbitration under a Salary Cap  
 
MLS imposes a salary cap every year that all teams' total payroll cannot 
exceed.123  Every year the salary cap rises by a specified amount.124  The 
                                                          
118 Haisley, supra note 36. 
119 Id. 
120 See Fraser, 284 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2002).  In this instance, the League prevailed when the 
First Circuit held that there was no liability under 15 U.S.C.S. §§ 1, 2, 18 because the formation of 
the soccer association did not involve the acquisition or merger of existing business enterprises, but 
rather the formation of an entirely new entity which itself represented the creation of an entirely new 
market.  Id. 
121 See Borriello, supra note 31; see also Taylor Anderson, MLS Players “Willing To Strike” 
Over Free Agency?, SOUNDERS NATION (2015), https://soundersnation.com/2015/01/22/mls-
players-willing-strike-free-agency/ (noting that “[t]he players are arguing that the league has never 
been more popular, and that after a new broadcast deal with Fox Spots and ESPN, the league should 
be able to not only institute free agency but increase the minimum salaries for its players, who are 
currently some of the lowest paid professional soccer players in the world’s major leagues.”); Ty 
Duffy, MLS Owners Offer Laughable "Free Agency" Proposal To Players, Almost Inviting a Strike, 
THE BIG LEAD (March 3, 2015), http://thebiglead.com/2015/03/03/mls-owners-offer-laughable-free-
agency-proposal-to-players-almost-inviting-a-strike/. 
122 See 1 JAMES T. GRAY, SPORTS LAW PRACTICE § 1.09 (Matthew Bender, 3d ed. 2017) 
(“[A]rbitration has played a significant role in the resolution of a variety of disputes in the sports 
industry. As a result, many of the major legal issues in the professional sports industry have been 
resolved, not in the courtroom, but in the arbitrator’s office.”). 
123 Collective Bargaining Agreement Between Major League Soccer and Major League Soccer 
Players Union: February 1, 2015 – January 31, 2020. 
124 Id. 
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amounts are documented in the CBA for each year the CBA is in effect.125  
Instituting a salary arbitration system in a league with a salary cap can pose a 
number of challenges.126  
First, the evidentiary rules of the NHL and MLB systems would need to 
slightly be altered.  In the NHL’s127 and MLB’s128 models of salary arbitration, 
the information regarding the teams' and leagues’ finances is not 
admissible.129  For those salary arbitration models to work in MLS, such 
evidence would be necessary for arbitrators to ensure the team in arbitration 
observes the League’s salary cap.130  While this would potentially limit the 
sums that players can be awarded, it will cause players to be more selective 
when submitting claims in arbitration.131  As a beneficial consequence, a 
potential drawback in the League’s eyes may be cured.  That is, the salary cap 
would limit a player to pursue salary arbitration only when the club has 
enough money to spend under the cap.132 
Second, the salary cap would present the problem of how a team's 
remaining cap room gets divided if more than one player on a team chooses 
to pursue salary arbitration.133  Under the MLB and NHL salary arbitration 
models, teammates are heard independently, which prevents arbitrators from 
inappropriately comparing teammates with each other; this allows each player 
an opportunity to be judged on his own merits.134  For the same reasons, and 
in the same mold as those salary arbitration models, MLS players should 




Major League Soccer's adoption of MLB's and NHL’s salary arbitration 
system can benefit the players, the teams, and the League as a whole.  MLS 
Commissioner Don Garber has repeatedly stated publicly that he intends for 
MLS to be a “top league” by 2022.135  However, the League’s publicly stated 
goal is hampered by its business and development structure.136  MLS is 
hampered because, as has been detailed above, the League keeps salaries 
                                                          
125 Id. 
126 See Quiles, supra note 7, at 275. 
127 NHL Collective Bargaining Agreement art. 12. 
128 MLB Collective Bargaining Agreement art. VI. 
129 See Quiles, supra note 7, at 275. 
130 Id. (coming to a similar solution on a similar problem). 
131 See id. 
132 See id. 
133 See id. 
134 MLB Collective Bargaining Agreement art. VI; NHL Collective Bargaining Agreement art. 
12. 
135 Noah Davis, MLS Has a 2022 Problem, VICE SPORTS (June 16, 2016, 7:44 AM), 
https://sports.vice.com/en_us/article/wnmdw9/mls-has-a-2022-problem (writing that Garber has 
made statements to the fact in 2011, 2013, and 2015). 
136 Davis, supra note 135. 
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artificially depressed in an effort to curb spending and limit losses.137  If MLS 
wants to meet its goal of becoming a top league, like the English Premier 
League for example, then MLS needs to compensate its players in a manner 
similar to the top leagues.138 
Instituting a non-biased forum to deal with salary disputes prior to the 
season, MLS could more effectively compensate its players with salaries that 
are commensurate with their skills and performance.  This, in turn, should 
place MLS on the path of elevating itself to the level of the world’s top 
leagues.  Higher salaries mean that MLS would attract better talent from 
around the world.   
Furthermore, salary arbitration not only represents a pathway for the 
League to attract better talent, it also represents a way for teams to keep the 
talent they already have.  Take, for example, the salary dispute between 
Hungarian attacker Krisztian Nemeth and Sporting Kansas City.139  Nemeth 
scored 10 goals in 28 appearances, and was one of Sporting’s most effective 
players.140  “[Nemeth’s] original contract was for four seasons, meaning he 
still had three years left on a deal that [would pay] him $250,000.”141  
However, Nemeth saw that he had out-performed the value of his contract and 
he accordingly asked the club for a raise in salary.142  Unfortunately, the two 
sides could not come to an agreement.143  According to Sporting, “Nemeth’s 
asking price was just too high,” and the team could not afford to meet his 
salary demands.144  Unwilling to give Nemeth a raise, and without an 
arbitration mechanism, Sporting saw itself left only with the unpalatable 
option of selling the valuable twenty-seven year-old to Al-Gharafa of the 
Qatari league.145  This example is just one of many where a salary arbitration 
system could have possibly represented an avenue for a team to retain valuable 
talent.  Further, the League would have correspondingly benefited by keeping 
a player of Nemeth’s caliber.  
MLS’s current structure of player compensation harms the individual 
players, clubs, owners, fans, and even the League in the long run.  A salary 
arbitration system incorporating the most beneficial mechanisms of MLB and 
the NHL represents a definite way to rectify the challenging problem of 
inequitable player compensation.  
                                                          
137 Id. 
138 See id. (“The average salary for a player at Chelsea – the club with the seventh-highest 
average salary – is $7.46 million,” which is “nearly half a million more than Kaká, MLS's highest 
paid player.”).  
139 Jason Davis, The Problem with MLS on a Budget, UNITED STATES NATIONAL SOCCER 
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